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This paper investigates the contagion from Russia to Brazil in late 1998 under two
dimensions— players involved and the timing of events. The data does not seem to reflect
a compensatory liquidation of assets story by international institutional investors. It does
contribute, however, to the suspicion that the contagion was triggered by foreign investors
panicking from the Russian crisis, and joining local residents on their speculation against
the Brazilian real. Adjusted correlations in the Brady market increase significantly during
the crisis, which lends support to the view that if there was a contagion from Russia to
Brazil, the most likely place of the transmission was the off-shore Brady market. Finally,
the paper does not support the hypothesis that it was the liquidity crisis in mature markets,
and not the Russian crisis, that timed the crisis in Brazil.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Russian crisis of August 1998, a series of events led to the
Brazilian crisis that culminated in the floating of the Real on January 1999. The timing of the
events led academic and policy making observers to suspect that there was a contagion from
the Russian crisis to Brazil. If true, the transmission of pressure from Russia to Brazil would
be somewhat of a special case among the financial crises episodes seen in the 1990s. In
contrast to the Mexican (1994) and Thai (1997) crises, the Russian contagion to Brazil
appears to have crossed regional borders, leading to a number of interesting questions. Given
the lack of substantial trade and direct financial linkages, why did the Russian devaluation
prompt capital flight from Brazil? Why did some countries with similar fundamentals and
economic links did not have a crisis (as for example Hungary)? In this paper, we attempt to
verify the contagion presumption, and analyze related issues that can shed light on our
current understanding of financial crises and contagion.
The paper begins from the premise that the Brazilian economy was vulnerable to
crisis from its increasing internal and external imbalances, and that it was not pure panic that
forced a devaluation of the exchange rate. Subsequently, the paper concentrates on the timing
of the crisis. To what extent can the timing of the deterioration in Brazilian financial market
variables be attributed to changes in fundamentals or, alternatively, to pure investor panic
from the Russian crisis? What was the role of international capital markets in the
transmission of the Russian crisis to Brazil? In particular, what was the role of margin calls,
on large portfolio managers with Brazilian asset holdings, in this transmission mechanism?
This paper, being a case study, has the advantage of concentrating on a single crisis
and its consequences on another single country. This allows us to pull different sources of
data to answer the question raised above. The disadvantage is the possible loss of generality
if specific Russian and Brazilian characteristic influence our conclusions regarding the
contagion mechanism.
The goal of the paper is to examine the contagion from Russia to Brazil under two
dimensions. First, we address the timing of the events. In particular, what triggered the run
on Brazil, was it the Russian default or the liquidity crisis in the developed financial markets
at the time of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis? Second, who were the
players involved and on what assets the attack was carried out? The answer to this would
give us a sense on whether it was mainly foreign (possibly institutional) investors or
Brazilian residents that panicked and precipitated the crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we examine the stylized facts
regarding both the players and the timing of the events linked to the contagion from Russia to
Brazil. In particular, we analyze the claim that as Russian markets tumbled, some large
portfolio managers faced margin calls, and in order to balance their portfolio, had to liquidate
positions in Brazil. The analysis first scrutinizes the chronology of the events surrounding the
Russian devaluation and examines the timing of Brazilian Brady bonds price fall and the- 4 -
subsequent loss in reserves. Second, we use information on foreign investors and analyze
their behavior during the crisis.
In section III, we conduct an econometric exercise to shed light on the extent of
fundamentals and contagion-driven movements. We study daily correlations between the
Russian and Brazilian equity indices and sovereign spreads, and test for significant change in
correlations, taking into account the bias described by Forbes and Rigobon (1999). In
addition, we regress changes in financial market variables on variables proxying for
fundamentals in each country, and examine the residual correlations between the countries.
Finally, in order to estimate the cross-border market pressure and its effect on reserves and
sovereign spreads, we use reduced form Vector Auto-Regressions to estimate the impulse
response of a fall in Russia’s financial prices on Brazilian variables.
The paper concludes that the data does not seem to reflect a compensatory liquidation
of assets story by international institutional investors. It does contribute, however, to the
suspicion that the contagion from Russia was triggered by foreign investors panicking from
the Russian crisis and joining local residents on their speculation against the currency.
Also, the comovement between the financial variables is remarkable, specially with
regards to the spreads on Brady bonds where the correlations in the Brady markets are very
high and increase significantly (even after adjusting for the bias) during the crisis. This gives
support to the fact that if there was a contagion from Russia to Brazil, the most likely place
of the transmission was the off-shore Brady markets.
Finally, the paper does not support the alternative hypothesis that it was the liquidity
crisis in mature markets that timed the crisis in Brazil and not the Russian crisis.
II. FROM RUSSIA TO BRAZIL: CONTAGION THROUGH THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
A. Events in Russia
Russia underwent a stabilization process from 1995 onwards, anchored by the policy
of maintaining the exchange rate within a band. This policy proved unsustainable as political
turmoil and deterioration in the external environment cast increasing doubts on Russia’s
ability to come to contain its economic fragility. The consequence was a severe financial
crisis that erupted in mid-1998, owing primarily to the failure to tackle underlying fiscal
problems.
Through 1996-97, Russia continued to incur large fiscal deficits of 7-8½ percent of
GDP at the federal level, resulting in a huge increase in its debt burden, particularly at the
short term maturity end. In addition, by mid-1998, the external terms of trade had
deteriorated by almost 18 percent, year-on-year, due to a drop in international prices for
Russia's main exports. The impact of the Asian economic crisis was severe on Russia, as
investor withdrawals from emerging markets affected its capital account. Net financing of the- 5 -
federal government deficit by nonresidents in the form of Eurobonds and ruble-denominated
debt declined by 1.8 percent of GDP during July 1997-June 1998, compared with the
previous 12-month period.
From late-1997 onwards, domestic interest rates were increased sharply in response to
the deterioration in the balance of payments. While the ruble was successfully maintained
within its band until mid-August 1998, the absence of decisive fiscal adjustments resulted in
large losses of external reserves. Faced with a severe cash-flow problem as investors
continued to withdraw from the government debt market and as international reserves
dropped precipitously, the authorities announced a restructuring of ruble-denominated
government debt and a widening of the exchange rate band in August 1998. The ruble was
subsequently allowed to float in early September. The servicing of Soviet-era external debt
was halted, and the government initiated talks with creditors for a rescheduling of such debt
falling due in 1999-2000.
The domestic impact of these developments was highly unfavorable. A large number
of banks that had invested heavily in treasury bills and had extensive foreign currency
exposure collapsed, the domestic payment system was temporarily impaired, access to
international capital markets was severed, and trade financing was severely disrupted.
The external the crisis was also severe. Investors suffered major losses from both the
restructuring of the Russian debt and the devaluation of the ruble. Others were surprised by
the fact that it occurred within an IMF program, and panicked regarding other emerging
markets.
B. Events in Brazil: suspicion of contagion?
The crisis in Russia set off upheaval in the world financial markets. In Brazil, the effect
on the exchange market was extreme. In August and September alone, the excess demand for
dollars in the foreign exchange market was 11.8 and 18.9 billion dollars, respectively (see
Table 1). The loss of reserves during these months was substantial, and reflected widespread
loss of investor confidence on the Brazilian real on the heels of the spectacular collapse of
the Russian ruble.
A note on the Brazilian laws and institutions is warranted here. Prior to the Brazilian
crisis, the central bank of Brazil was setting an adjustable band for the dollar value of the
real, and maintaining a continuing crawling peg within it. There were two foreign exchange
markets— the “official,” and the “floating” market. The former was intended mostly for
transacting proceeds of exports and imports of goods and services, but it had allowed capital
account transactions in a number of instances. Notably, large portions of portfolio investment
by foreign investors were transacted through this account. These investments were channeled
either through two classes of fixed-income funds or through one of the five alternatives
established under National Monetary Council Resolution 1289. In the floating market most
of the rest of the capital account transactions was transacted, in particular, those made by- 6 -
Brazilian residents. The Brazilian government would keep the exchange rates on both
markets aligned and would not allowed big differences between them.
The data from the official and floating markets offer valuable insights, as they reveal
the dynamics of capital flow across foreign domestic investors. Table 1 provides a
breakdown of flows in these markets, as well as reserve data during the corresponding
periods. Flows data during the months around the Russian crisis reveal that the extent of
withdrawals in the official market during the Russian crisis was severe, reflecting
withdrawals from foreign investors. Table 1 also provides breakdown of flows data around
the Asian crisis, which illustrate as an interesting contrast. Investors to Brazil appear to not
have been too concerned during the Asian crisis, as the magnitude of the withdrawals were
around the typical range for the market. Their behavior was starkly different in the aftermath
of the Russian crisis, as seen in Table 1.
The floating market data, representing domestic investor behavior, had shown sizable
withdrawals during the Asian crisis. During the Russian crisis, the outflows were even larger,
and fueled by fears from parallel withdrawals in the official markets. The key difference
between the impact of the Asian and the Russian crisis on Brazilian markets was that in the
latter case official withdrawals took place in a much larger scale. The information obtained
from the two separate exchange markets tends to suggest that the withdrawals from foreign
investors was a major factor in the exacerbation of the Brazilian crisis. This contributes to the
suspicion that the contagion from Russia was triggered by foreign investors panicking from
the Russian crisis. The floating market investors, representing Brazilian residents, had
jumped ship during the Asian crisis, and repeated the pattern during the Russian crisis,
adding further to the pressure in the exchange market.
Figure 1 shows, for the two countries, the movement of spreads on Brady bonds and
reserves during 1997-98. The figures shed light on the timing of the events. The co-
movement between the variables is remarkable (this is tested formally in section III). It is
important to remember than in pegged regimes (or crawling pegs), the appropriate variables
to infer pressure are either reserve movements or interest rate levels. The latter are better
used when looking at non-policy interest rates, that are more market determined and less
influenced by short term objectives of policy makers.
With daily data, one can check the alternative hypothesis that it was the liquidity
crisis in mature markets that timed the crisis in Brazil and not the Russian crisis. The Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis surfaced in September 1999,
2 while the Russian
default happened a month earlier, on August 17. Figure 2 illustrates movements in two
benchmark Brazilian spreads—the C-Bond and IDU. They, along with the flows figure
reveal that most of the developments took place immediately after the Russian crisis both in
the foreign exchange and the Brady bond markets, although the spreads on the latter market
                                               
2 The rescue plan was announced the 23
rd of the month.- 7 -
suffered a new blow during the LTCM crisis (specially the shorter maturity Brazilian IDU
bond). The fact that the reaction was initiated a couple of weeks before the LTCM crisis
leads us to favor the argument that the Brazilian residents reinforced the speculation once
they realized that foreign and institutional investors had joined the capital flight.
Other Brazilian financial variables reflect the Russian crisis with different lags. The
floating of the exchange rate occurred only in January, 1999, five months after the Russian
crisis. At the beginning, interest policy rate (overnight rate on federal funds - SELIC) was
raised to levels close to the ones reached during the Asian crisis, but this time speculation
forced the change in the exchange regime (Figure 3).
Table 1.  Brazil:  Foreign Exchange Market Net Flows, July 1995-November 1999 1/









Average July 1995-July 1998 -1,322 2,670 1,348 992
Average August-December 1998 -3,601 -4,326 -7,927 -6,996
Average July 1995-November 1999 -1,593 1,324 62 -198
Asian Crisis Sep-97 -1,651 613 -1,038 -1,125
Oct-97 -4,912 -1,039 -5,951 -8,241
Nov-97 -3,700 -292 -3,992 -1,655
Russian Crisis Jul-98 -1,839 6,693 4,854 -688
Aug-98 -2,821 -8,989 -11,810 -2,877
Sep-98 -8,578 -10,346 -18,924 -21,522
Oct-98 -2,867 971 -1,897 -3,426
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/  Negative sign implies net outflows.- 8 -
Figure 1. Brazil and Russia: Bond Spreads and Reserves
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and Bloomberg.
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Figure 2. Brazil: Brady Bonds and Foreign Exchange Market, August-Septemer 1998
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and Bloomberg.


































Figure 3. Interest and Exchange Rates, January 1997-April 1999
Source:  Central Banks of Russia and Brazil.
1/ Rate used is SELIC rate, the Central Bank funds rate on overnight deposits.
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C.   The effect of the Russian crisis on Brazilian capital Flows
Following a trend common to other emerging markets, private capital inflows to
Brazil disappeared in the 1980s and increased dramatically after 1991. By 1993, the fall of
international interest rates had eased the external debt burden, and it led to an agreement with
creditor banks in 1994 with an exchange of instruments, covering over $50 billion in debt
stocks and arrears.
At the end of 1994, Mexico's financial crisis led to an immediate cutback in capital
flows to emerging markets. During the fourth quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 1995,
the net flow of capital to Brazil was insufficient to finance its current account, and the central
bank lost reserves of about $9.8 billion. Private capital returned to Brazil soon, however, as a
joint US-IMF bailout package of Mexico brought investors back to emerging markets. At the
end of 1995 net capital flows were close to $30 billion, and in 1996 net inflows reached
$33 billion. In the next two years net capital flows declined again, down to about $20 billion
in 1998, owing to the impact of the Asian and Russian crisis, as well as the increasing
perception that the Brazilian economy was in an unsustainable path.
The composition of flows during this period is interesting. Table 2 and Figure 4 show
that the share of net direct investment increased steadily, surpassing $20 billion dollars in
both 1998 and 1999. In contrast the crisis hit other components of flows very hard.
 i. Impact on capital flows
We devote this section to investigate the impact of the Russian crisis on monthly
capital flows to Brazil. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, controlling for
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, is:
where nf, i, i*, Ee are the net capital flows as a percentage of GDP, the domestic interest rate,
the US interest rate, and expected devaluation, respectively. X denotes a group of variables,
including inflation, government spending, the real exchange rate, and a series of dummies for
the Real Plan, the Tequila crisis, the Asian crisis, the Brazilian crisis, and the Russian crisis.
The dummies take on a value of 1 during the month the crisis began. The results are
summarized in Table 3 below.
As predicted by theory, the coefficient of the international interest rate is negative and
significant. This result is consistent with evidence for Latin America in Calvo et al. (1993),
and with the evidence for developing countries in Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1995). The
result is robust across specifications and to using either returns on U.S. Treasury bills or
,   +   X     + *  i   +   Ee) - (i   +     =  
GDP
NF
  =   nf 2 1 0 e b b b B- 12 -
yields on 10-year Treasury bonds. The coefficient of the domestic interest rate adjusted for
expected depreciation and the coefficients of other domestic factors do not help in explaining
capital flows to Brazil. We interpret the results as evidence in favor of push effects as
opposed to pull effects in explaining the movement in capital flows.
The dummies for the Tequila, Real plan and Asian crisis are strong and significant.
However, the Russian crisis seems to have not affected significantly the flow of capital in a
longer perspective. This is a bit surprising, but one should take into account the change in the
composition of capital flows to Brazil in the mid and late nineties. Net foreign investment
replaced other component of flows during this period, and that may have dampened the effect
of the Russian crisis. In higher frequency (daily) data, we have observed a large withdrawal
of capital during the Russian crisis. Therefore, from the point of view of lower frequencies
and aggregated data (total flows), one cannot not observe the contagion effects from the
Russian crisis to Brazil. Also, the regression results could be interpreted as indicative of the
fact that the Russian crisis did not have an impact on the medium and long term flows to
Brazil.
Table 2.  Brazil:  Capital Flows, 1991-99
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1/
Net direct investment -408 1,268 -481 852 2,376 9,519 15,364 22,988 25,946
   Foreign direct investment 505 1,156 397 117 5,475 10,349 17,086 26,134 27,109
      Reinvestment 365 175 100 83 384 531 151 124 …
   Net domestic investment -913 112 -878 -1,065 -1,560 77 -1,569 -3,212 -1,163
Equity securities 578 1,704 6,651 7,280 2,294 6,040 5,300 -1,861 1,529
Debt securities 2,368 5,761 5,866 3,713 3,113 12,727 19,771 28,968 -7,982
Short-term capital and others -7,406 -2,844 -4,432 -3,824 15,523 4,857 -15,517 -30,032 -1,943
Total -4,868 5,889 7,604 8,020 29,306 33,142 24,918 20,063 …
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/ 1999 data are for January through November.- 13 -
Figure 4.  Brazil:  Composition of Capital Flows, June 1988-November 1999
(Six-month moving averages)
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Table 3.  Regression Results:  Impact of the Russian Crisis on Capital Flows to Brazil
(Dependent variable: Ratio of monthly total net private capital flows to GDP)
Sample:  January 1988-November 1999   Sample:  January 1995-November 1999
Constant 4.78 4.95 5.28 24.83 42.75
5.05 5.14 2.69 1.20 2.23
i* -0.64 -0.68 -0.79 -3.87 -7.04
-4.60 -4.68 -3.13 -0.99 -1.86
i - Ee -0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.62 -0.42
-0.62 -0.64 0.50 -3.19 -0.94
Tequila dummy -5.65 -5.96 -6.07
-5.60 -5.43 -5.33
Real plan dummy 2.47 2.78 2.49
2.98 2.99 2.46
Asian dummy 2.73 2.41 2.42 1.77 1.11
2.99 2.42 2.42 1.25 0.87
Russian dummy - -4.60 -4.86 -6.50 -8.00
-1.63 -1.54 -1.29 -1.67
Brazilian dummy - -0.56 -0.09 -2.83 3.03
-0.47 -0.06 -1.07 0.40
Inflation rate - - 0.01 - -0.27
0.28 -0.36
Ratio of government  - - 2.38 - -26.38
 spending to GDP 0.24 -1.05
Real exchange rate - - -2.48 - -26.29
(deviation from  -0.55 -0.87
equilibrium rate)
Adjusted R
2 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.05 0.09
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.- 15 -
 ii. Impact on short term exposure
Subsequent to the crisis in Russia, and leading up to the real’s devaluation, foreign
investors reduced their exposure to Brazil as maturing obligations came due. The Central
Bank of Brazil’s survey data, which follows the maturing short term external liabilities of
its banking system in a weekly basis, provides interesting insight regarding this issue.
3
Table 4 shows the cumulative reduction in short term exposure to Brazilian banks by
nationality in the last quarter of 1999. Over the sample period, out of the total US$6.6 billion
that was maturing, about US$4 billion was rolled over, amounting to a rollover rate of around
62 percent. U.S. banks reduced their exposure by US$931 million, with a rollover rate of 60
percent. Within the US, almost one-half of the reduction came from two banks, and ten banks
accounted for 84 percent of the total decline. Many regional banks were found to have
reduced their exposure.
The rollover rate for US banks was well below the rollover rates of Germany (79
percent) and the UK (77 percent), although it was roughly in line with Japan (58 percent),
France (54 percent) and Italy (60 percent). This is interesting because it bears on our
fundamental question regarding the contagion from Russia to Brazil. As table 4 shows,
German banks, which had huge exposure to Russia and were consequently badly affected by
the Russian crisis, had a rollover rate far above the group average. Thus the hypothesis that
liquidity needs and withdrawals were one of channels of contagion does not find support
from the data. The available evidence does not reflect a compensatory liquidation of assets.
4
The data also allows us to follow the timing of the reduction of exposure, although
with a lag given that the first data is from the third week of October. Figure 5 shows the net
outflows per week and the rollover rate over time. The weekly changes in exposure have
been volatile, with a particularly sharp deterioration in October and over the final two weeks
of the year, which was principally due to end-year window dressing. The high rollover weeks
happen in April, 1999 after the Brazilian agreement with international banks to maintain
short term credit lines. For the 11-week monitoring period ending January 1, 1999, the
aggregate rollover rate was 72 percent. The weekly observations, however, have been
volatile, ranging from 50 percent to 90 percent. It is interesting also to note that the
                                               
3 The short term obligations include interbank and credit lines. The survey based
monitoring system was introduced on October 1998, after the Russian crisis and during
the negotiations with the IMF.
4 It is noteworthy that German banks received a large number of guarantees on their Russian
loans from the state-supported export-guarantee agency Hermes, which may have lessened
their losses compared to other banks. Besides, they had set aside higher provisions for bad
debts than other countries' banks.- 16 -
international banks did not increase their exposure to the levels seen before the Russian
crisis. This was in part due to lack of demand for short term borrowing by Brazilian banks
after the floating of the exchange rate and the associated higher exchange rate risk.
Table 4. Brazil:  Changes in Exposure of Short-term Loans, October 1-Decmber 31, 1998 1/
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Amount Maturing Amount Rolled Over Rollover Rate
United States 2,352 1,421 0.60
Canada  168 74 0.44
France 947 516 0.54
Germany 1,060 835 0.79
Italy 215 129 0.60
Japan 715 416 0.58
Netherlands 222 69 0.31
Portugal 97 90 0.93
Spain  350 145 0.41
UK 505 389 0.77
Total 6,630 4,082 0.62
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/ Includes interbank loans and trade credits.- 17 -
Figure 5. Brazil:  Short-term Capital Flow and Rollover Rates, October 1998-July 1999
Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
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iii.    BIS data and overall bank exposure
The weekly monitoring system by the central bank of Brazil has the advantage of a
higher frequency but the coverage is not universal, as only short term assets are included.
In contrast, the data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), published twice a
year, has a broader coverage. Table 5 and Figure 6 show the overall exposure of reporting
banks on Brazil and other emerging markets. The exposure on Brazil decreased by around
$10 billion dollars from the first half of 1998 to the first half of 1999, while the exposure
in Russia decreased by almost $15 billion dollars in the same period.
It is interesting to note the similar path for the banks exposure to Russia and
Brazil, in contrast to the rest of Latin America, in particular Mexico and Argentina. The
reduction of the exposure to Asia diminished about a year earlier. The different paths for
the exposure on Brazil and the rest of Latin America provides support to the fact that the
contagion from the Russian crisis was not generalized, as it would be if driven only by
liquidity needs.
Table 5.  Commercial Banks' Exposure to Selected Countries, 1997H1-1999H1 1/
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Brazil Mexico Russia Argentina
1997H1 71,862 62,161 69,081 44,844
1997H2 76,292 61,794 72,173 60,413
1998H1 84,585 62,892 75,853 60,222
1998H2 73,313 64,962 58,594 61,517
1999H1 62,310 63,776 55,424 66,683
  Source:  Bank for International Settlements. 
  1/ H refers to half-yearly data.- 19 -
Figure 6.  Bank Holdings in Emerging Markets, 1995-1999
(Index:  1994H2=100) 1/
Source:  Bank for International Settlements.













III. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF CONTAGION
A. Methodology
In this exercise, we primarily focus on the stock indices and sovereign spreads.
Analyzing the currency market is not very useful as for most of the sample period, both the
Brazilian real and the Russian ruble were fixed to the dollar. The currencies move about
relatively freely only after January 1999 (when the Real peg unraveled), but that period
leaves out many important phases of the crisis. Instead of directly looking at the exchange
rate, we devote a part of our analysis to the data from financial flows, which in turn is
affected by associated exchange rate volatility.
In order to understand the transmission of shocks from Russia to Brazil, we carry out
a series of tests. We begin by looking at rolling correlations (at three month interval) between
the relevant variables. We also use reduced form VARs to examine the direction of shocks
between Russia and Brazil.
We then define crisis and tranquil periods, and test for significant changes in
correlations between the two periods. We apply the Forbes and Rigobon (1999) methodology
to adjust the crisis period correlations for sudden increase in variance (see Appendix). The
motivation for this approach is to control for the correlation bias associated with higher
variances, as in the standard correlation formula, higher variances lead to higher correlations.
Once the adjustment is performed, crisis period correlations can be tested for significant
increases without the potential of this bias. However, we use the Forbes and Rigobon test
with caution, as we are not sure a study of contagion ought to control for the increased
variances, as volatility is an integral part of any crisis scenario. It could very well be that the
factors behind the increased variances (thin markets, panic, institutional failure, etc.) are
precisely what make up contagion, and controlling for these factors make test for contagion
moot.
B. Dummy variables
One can define contagion as co-movements in financial variables in excess of those
that can be explained by co-movements of fundamentals. Under this definition, in order to
identify contagion, it is essential to distinguish between fundamentals and non-fundamentals-
driven co-movements. Empirically, if, after controlling for fundamentals, one finds
significant co-movement among the markets of two countries, then the remaining
unexplained correlation may be attributed to contagion (for example, panic or investor
sentiment shift).
There are significant empirical difficulties to implement this methodology of
identifying contagion. Given that most fundamentals are measured infrequently, at least in
comparison to the frequency available for financial data, one has to be sure that there is
comprehensive and reliable data available that represents movements in fundamentals. In- 21 -
general, there are no high frequency variables (e.g. daily data) that can approximate
fundamentals in each country. In the absence of such data, one approach is to create a set of
daily variables constructed from news reported by the press that could proxy for movements
in fundamentals. This approach follows Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky
and Schmukler (1998), who attempt to estimate the impact of various news events on market
movements. These papers map daily news of a country into a set of dummy variables in order
to quantify the impact of policy announcements and other news on financial markets. We
followed this literature, as well as our previous work (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999) and created
two series of dummy variables—good and bad news—for each country.
The mapping of fundamentals to news and then to a couple of dummy variables
involves an inevitable degree of subjectivity. However, in order to ensure a rigorous and
replicable procedure, we provide in the appendix a set of guidelines that we followed.
Although parts of these “news” were in some degree expected by the market and,
therefore, already factored in the financial variable prices, there always remains some
uncertainty that is realized the day the announcement effectively occurs. For example, days
when bailout packages are announced or central bank statements are released are well known
in advance, but the market nevertheless reacts to them, revealing that there was some degree
of uncertainty whether these announcements were to occur. We therefore included “news”
that were partially anticipated.
In the regression exercise we first regress the financial variables of the countries on
their own news and other selected fundamentals. The idea is that own news is a proxy for
changes in fundamentals, whereas changes in the fortune of another country is a potential
source of contagion. Second, we regress for each country its financial variable against
dummies of both countries on the right hand side to evaluate the impact of cross-border
news.
We begin our investigation by trying to establish the correct sample period to study.
We want to be able to define a tranquil and crisis episode in order to compare results from
the two periods and analyze the factors behind the movements. Given the numerous shocks
that financial markets have faced recently, isolating a period of relative tranquility is
somewhat difficult. Simply choosing a period before the August 98 Russian default is not
sufficient, as the emerging markets were hit by the Asian crisis in late 1997 and 1998. As
Figures 7 and 8 show, the markets in both the countries in discussion were affected by the
Asian crisis as spreads shot up. Thus the data from that period onwards is likely to contain
some noise. With this in mind, we choose January 1, 1997 to May 30, 1997 as our tranquil
period. For the crisis period, we use data from January 1, 1998 onwards for correlation and
VAR analysis. For the regressions, we use dummy variables that are defined from a month
prior to the Russian default; therefore our sample begins from July 1, 1998.- 22 -
Figure 7. Brazil and Russia: Stock Market Indices, January 1, 1997-June 30, 1999
Source:  Bloomberg.
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Figure 8. Brazil and Russia: Sovereign Spreads, January 1, 1997-December 31, 1998
Source:  Bloomberg.
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C. Correlation and VAR results
 i. Stock market
The first half of 1997 can be termed as a very favorable time for both the Brazilian
and Russian equity markets, as they returned, in dollar terms, 58 and 88 percent respectively
during the defined tranquil period. There is little evidence of interaction between the two
markets though. Correlation of the first log difference between the two markets was –0.11
during this period. Using two lags in a reduced form VAR, we find impulse responses (see
Figure 9) that reveal some evidence of the Russian equity market being affected by shocks in
the Brazilian market.
As the Asian crisis unfolded in the fall of 1997, the Brazilian stock market showed
some signs of nervousness, but the Russian market seemed undisturbed. Rolling correlations,
using three month windows, between September and December of 1997 show somewhat
higher, yet fairly stable, correlation between the two markets.
We find the correlations increase substantially by the first quarter of 1998, as Brazil’s
internal and external difficulties became more visible and Russia began to show signs of
nervousness (see Table 6). As financial difficulties in Russian became acute, correlations hit
0.51 in the April-June, 1998 window. We find correlations to go down drastically once the
Russian devaluation took place in August, but that is primarily a reflection of the sharp
decrease in the dollar value of the Russian stock index due to the depreciation of the ruble.
More importantly, correlations go up substantially again from October onwards, when the
crisis in Brazil worsens. It must be noted that the stock market correlations are not very high
at any point in the sample, with the highest magnitude of 0.51 is seen in the April-June, 1998
window.
In the impulse response functions (see Figure 9) from reduced form VARs, we find
significant impulse responses in Brazil from one standard deviation innovation in Russia.
This is valid only in the crisis period and not in the tranquil times, confirming our suspicion
of contagion from Russia to Brazil.- 25 -
Figure 9.  Impulse Response Functions (From Reduced-form VARs)
(Response of stock market in U.S. dollars to one S.D. innovation; )
Tranquil Period (January 1,1997 - May 30,1997)
Response of Brazil to Russia Response of Russia to Brazil
Crisis Period (January 1,1998 - June 30,1999)
Response of Brazil to Russia Response of Russia to Brazil
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Table 6.  Brazil and Russia:  Stock Market Correlations, January 1997-June 1999 1/









01/01/1997 - 05/30/1997 83 -0.11
Crisis Period
   Full Sample 09/01/1997 - 12/31/1998 300 0.04 0.01 0.47
   Three-month windows 09/01/1997 - 11/28/1997 63 0.22 0.11** 2.27
10/01/1997 - 12/31/1997 58 0.21 0.09** 1.88
10/31/1997 - 01/30/1998 53 0.34 0.19** 3.72
12/01/1997 - 02/27/1998 49 0.27 0.16** 2.82
01/01/1998 - 03/31/1998 52 0.18 0.11** 2.14
01/30/1998 - 04/30/1998 53 0.31 0.29** 5.73
02/27/1998 - 05/29/1998 54 0.39 0.27** 5.24
04/01/1998 - 06/30/1998 52 0.51 0.28** 5.30
05/01/1998 - 07/31/1998 56 0.44 0.18** 3.62
06/01/1998 - 08/31/1998 61 0.36 0.14** 2.90
07/01/1998 - 09/30/1998 62 -0.17 -0.04 -0.75
07/31/1998 - 10/30/1998 62 -0.15 -0.03 -0.66
09/01/1998 - 11/30/1998 57 -0.20 -0.04 -0.83
10/01/1998 - 12/31/1998 54 0.13 0.06 1.12
10/30/1998 - 01/29/1999 49 0.26 0.16** 2.90
12/01/1998 - 02/26/1999 46 0.22 0.13** 2.23
01/01/1999 - 03/31/1999 50 0.27 0.14** 2.60
02/01/1999 - 04/30/1999 51 0.20 0.10** 1.82
03/01/1999 - 05/31/1999 52 0.17 0.07 1.21
04/01/1999 - 06/30/1999 48 0.13 0.05 0.93
  Source:  Bloomberg; authors' estimates.
  1/ Placement of ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 27 -
ii. Sovereign spreads
The tranquil period sovereign spreads correlations are substantially larger than what
we saw in the stock market case. Using 106 observations from January – May, 1997, we find
the correlation to be 0.35.  The spreads of both the bonds in discussion shot up even further
in the crisis period (see Figure 8). The correlation of the spreads also jumped (see Table 7),
and remained at very high levels till late 1998.
The adjusted correlations for the spreads show significantly higher correlation during
the crisis period sub-samples when compared to the tranquil period (see Table 7). All but two
sub-samples in the crisis period had significantly higher adjusted correlations. This confirms
our findings from previous work (Baig and Goldfajn, 1998) that the correlations in the Brady
markets are very high and increases significantly (even after the adjustment) during the crisis.
This gives support to the fact that if there was a contagion from Russia to Brazil, the most
likely place of the transmission was the off-shore Brady markets.
The impulse responses (see Figure 10) show mutually reinforcing responses during
the crisis period.
iii. Financial flows
The financial flows variables allow us to look deeper into the market dynamics of
Brazil, and see how the two markets, one dominated by domestic players and the other by
foreigners, behaved. Financial flows are the balance of the foreign exchange transactions in
the financial markets. Ultimately the government would have to balance the market in order
to keep the exchange rate within the crawling peg band. However, the changes in reserves do
not necessarily track down exactly the financial exchange flows because some of the
transactions are settled with a lag period (30-days and so).
We find a correlation of –0.16 between the two markets during the tranquil period
(see Table 8). VARs do not provide evidence any shocks transmitting from one market to the
other.
We find that the directly after the onset of the Asian crisis, correlation between these
two markets jumped (up to 0.74 in September-December, 1997). The rolling correlation
show a great deal of volatility through 1998 as the correlations become negative and then
positive. The impulse response function (see Figure 11) from the crisis period also show that
the reaction of the official flows to innovations in the floating market flows is statistically
significant.
This is significant as the implication is that the local players precede foreign investors
in withdrawing capital from the crisis-affected country (as also found in Frankel and
Schmukler, 1996). This is consistent with the findings obtained in the previous section,
where we saw that withdrawals in the floating market were present in both the Asian and- 28 -
Figure 10.  Impulse Response Functions (From Reduced-form VARs)
(Response of sovereign spreads to one S.D. innovation)
Tranquil Period (January 1,1997 - May 30,1997)
Response of Brazil to Russia Response of Russia to Brazil
Crisis Period (January 1,1998 - December 31, 1998)
Response of Brazil to Russia Response of Russia to Brazil
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1/01/1997 5/30/1997 106 0.35
Crisis Period
  Full Sample 09/01/1997 12/31/1998 335 0.94 0.32 -1.31
  Three-month windows 09/01/1997 11/28/1997 65 0.87 0.97** 39.55
10/01/1997 12/31/1997 66 0.82 0.94** 33.00
10/31/1997 01/30/1998 58 0.41 0.85** 19.11
12/01/1997 02/27/1998 57 0.51 0.93** 27.21
01/01/1998 03/31/1998 55 0.87 0.99** 46.34
01/30/1998 04/30/1998 62 0.86 0.99** 54.63
02/27/1998 05/29/1998 62 0.89 0.99** 63.42
04/01/1998 06/30/1998 62 0.91 0.97** 40.67
05/01/1998 07/31/1998 65 0.79 0.86** 21.80
06/01/1998 08/31/1998 66 0.98 0.67** 10.73
07/01/1998 09/30/1998 65 0.97 0.46 2.98
07/31/1998 10/30/1998 64 0.85 0.27 -2.17
09/01/1998 11/30/1998 63 0.29 0.50 4.23
10/01/1998 12/31/1998 65 -0.03 -0.02 -9.04
  Source:  Bloomberg; authors' estimates.
  1/ Placement of ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 30 -









1/01/1997 5/30/1997 100 -0.16
Crisis Period
  Full Sample 09/01/1997 12/31/1998 336 0.31 0.08** 2.90
  Three-month windows 09/01/1997 11/28/1997 65 0.74 0.19** 4.15
10/01/1997 12/31/1997 65 0.74 0.19** 4.15
10/31/1997 01/30/1998 64 0.1 0.05 1.01
12/01/1997 02/27/1998 61 -0.22 -0.22 -4.58
01/01/1998 03/31/1998 61 -0.07 -0.07 -1.41
01/30/1998 04/30/1998 60 -0.32 -0.15 -3.22
02/27/1998 05/29/1998 62 -0.19 -0.08 -1.67
04/01/1998 06/30/1998 60 -0.4 -0.18** -3.79
05/01/1998 07/31/1998 64 -0.1 -0.06 -1.31
06/01/1998 08/31/1998 65 0.28 0.17** 3.65
07/01/1998 09/30/1998 65 0.38 0.08 1.71
07/31/1998 10/30/1998 64 0.21 0.04 0.82
09/01/1998 11/30/1998 62 0.27 0.05 1.04
10/01/1998 12/31/1998 63 -0.22 -0.06 -1.29
10/30/1998 01/29/1999 62 0.64 0.44** 10.00
12/01/1998 01/29/1999 41 0.71 0.46** 7.76
01/01/1999 01/29/1999 19 0.83 0.53** 4.40
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/ Placement of ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 31 -
Figure 11.  Impulse Response Functions (From Reduced-form VARs)
(Response of financial flows to one S.D. innovation)
Tranquil Period (January 1,1997 - May 30,1997)
Response of Floating to Official Flows Response of Official to Floating Flows
Crisis Period (January 1,1998 - December 31, 1998)
Response of Floating to Official Flows Response of Official to Floating Flows
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Russian crisis but were followed by withdrawals in the official market only in the latter. This
induced the larger effect that eventually led to the Brazilian crisis.
The adjusted correlations (see Table 8) show that occasional sub-sample periods
when the crisis period correlations were higher than the tranquil period. The correlations also
show that subsequent to the Russian default there was surge of co-movement among these
markets.
D. Regression results
In this analysis, we only focus on the crisis period dynamics around the onset of the
Russian crisis. We were unable to carry out a cohesive filtering of the data prior to this
period, due to confusion regarding what constitutes good or bad news outside the context of
the devaluation of currencies and debt defaults in discussion.
i. Stock market
We begin by regressing the first log difference of the Russian and the Brazilian stock market
indices against their own good and bad news dummies, as well selected fundamentals (US
interest rate, Deutsche mark-dollar exchange rate, and the changes in the S&P stock index in
the US). For Brazil (see Table 9), we find that only changes in the US stock market has a
significant impact, with the right sign. Bad news from Russia also seem to have an adverse
impact, but only at a marginal 11 percent level of significance. For Russia, only bad news
from own-country has a significant and adverse impact on the stock market performance.
We then extend our analysis by including cross-country news dummies and
fundamentals on the right hand side of the regressions. The results are somewhat more
promising here. In the Brazil regression, bad news stemming from Brazil have a significant
and negative impact, thus providing further evidence of cross-border transmission of shocks.
The US stock market movements also have the right sign and statistical significance.
Throwing in the additional variable does not add much to the Russia regression, as the sole
variable of significance remain the Russian news dummy.
ii. Sovereign spreads
In the regressions with own-country news and other fundamentals (see Table 10), the
only variable that is statistically significant for the spreads in Brazil and Russia is the US
interest rate. In both regressions the US interest rate has a negative coefficient, which means
that increases in US interest rate leads to lowering of spreads in both the countries in
discussion.
For the extended regressions, in addition to the cross-country news dummies, we add
the stock market variables of both countries. In the regression for Brazil with the cross-
country dummies, bad news out of Russia has a significant and adverse impact on Brazilian- 33 -
spreads. In the Russia regression, own-country good news is significant, with the expected
sign. In both regressions, US interest rate remains significant and negative.
iii. Financial flows
During our correlation and causality work we found that that the Brazilian floating
flows had a significant impact on the official flows. It is important to establish what
caused the movement in the floating flows, as that will shed light on the reaction pattern
of the local market participant s in Brazil. Regressing the floating flows on the Brazilian
dummies and selected fundamentals, we find mark-dollar exchange rate and the bad news
dummy from Brazil to be significant (see Table 11). The positive coefficient with the
exchange rate imply that appreciation of the dollar leads to increase in floating flows,
whereas the negative news coefficient implies that bad news leads to decrease in the
flows.- 34 -
Table 9.  Brazil and Russia:  Stock Market Regression Results 1/
(Sample:  July 1, 1998-April 30, 1999; market indices in U.S. dollars; first log difference)
Dependent Variable:   Brazilian Stock Index  Russian Stock Index
Constant -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07
-0.04 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Brazilian dummy-good news 0.001 -0.003 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brazilian dummy-bad news -.001 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Russian dummy-good news -0.01 0.0003 -0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Russian dummy-bad news -0.02 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
U.S. interest rate 0.003 0.004 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DM/U.S. dollar rate (first log difference) 0.22 0.13 0.48 0.49
(0.43) (0.43) (0.61) (0.61)
U.S. stock index (first log difference) 1.78 ** 1.77 ** -0.29 -0.29
(0.20) (0.19) (0.27) (0.27)
Number of observations 184 184 182 182
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.06 0.05
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/ Placement of ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 35 -
Table 10.  Brazil and Russia:  Sovereign Spread Regression Results  1/
(Sample:  July 1 - December 30, 1998)
Dependent Variable:   Spreads on Brazilian C-Bond Spreads on Russian Eurobonds
Constant 2298.17 ** 2252.56 22296.40 21644.52
(200.88) (211.83) (1635.22) (1727.74)
Brazil dummy-good news -8.14 22.89 -193.46
(50.01) (54.63) (432.86)
Brazilian dummy-bad news 49.18 29.95 546.48
(78.62) (80.38) (662.17)
Russia dummy-good news -133.58 -681.40 -1350.23
(102.00) (715.33) (839.73)
Russian dummy-bad news 88.59 * 316.39 450.09
(47.76) (345.61) (392.17)
U.S. interest rate -282.72 ** -275.99 ** -3822.53 ** -3688.09 **
(43.00) (45.24) (351.66) (368.66)
DM/U.S. dollar rate (first log difference) -2866.99 -3435.57 -7776.41 -20296.81
(2322.46) (2432.83) (18956.55) (19903.28)
U.S. stock index (first log difference) -1182.91 -1169.30 -549.97 -4432.99
(1031.68) (1363.69) (8442.92) (11122.13)
Brazilian stock index (first log difference) 90.11 4845.30
(513.28) (4147.17)
Russia stock index (first log difference) 201.81 3102.82
(293.75) (2405.60)
Number of observations 115 106 117 182
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.50 0.05
  Source:  Bloomberg; authors' estimates.
  1/ Standard error in parentheses; placement of ** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 36 -
Table 11.  Brazil and Russia:  Financial Flows Regression Results,
 July 1, 1998-January 28, 1999 1/
Dependent Variable:  Floating Market Flows
Constant 0.45
(2.50)
Brazilian dummy-good news 0.13
(0.61)
Brazilian dummy-bad news -1.34 *
(0.75)
U.S. interest rate -0.41
(0.54)
DM/U.S. dollar rate (first log difference) 72.03 **
(27.68)
U.S. stock index (first log difference) 8.67
(15.79)
Brazilian stock index (first log difference) 1.33
(5.01)
Number of observations 128
Adjusted R-squared 0.05
  Source:  Central Bank of Brazil; and authors' estimates.
  1/ Standard error in parentheses; placement of ** and * denotes
significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.- 37 -
IV. Conclusions
The paper investigated the contagion from Russia to Brazil using several sets of data,
with different frequencies. We analyzed this case study under two dimensions: players
involved and timing of events. A few results are worth highlighting. First, using information
from daily movements in two distinct exchange markets we concluded that while the
withdrawals in the floating market were present in both the Asian and Russian crisis, they
were only followed by withdrawals in the official market in the latter crisis. This induced the
larger effect that eventually led to the Brazilian crisis. This contributes to the suspicion that
the contagion from Russia was triggered by foreign investors panicking from the Russian
crisis.
Second, using weekly data on foreign banks exposure to Brazil, we checked the
hypothesis that liquidity needs and withdrawals were one of the channels of contagion. We
observed that German banks (known to have had a large exposure to Russia and were badly
affected by the Russian crisis) had one of the highest rollover rates within the G7 and,
therefore, the data does not seem to reflect a compensatory liquidation of assets story.
Third, from the point of view of lower (monthly) frequencies and aggregated data
(total flows), one cannot not observe the contagion effects from the Russian crisis to Brazil..
Fourth, from the dimension of the timing of the events, the comovement between the
variables is remarkable, especially with regards to the spreads on Brady bonds. This confirms
our findings from previous work (Baig and Goldfajn, 1998) that the correlations in the Brady
markets are very high and increase significantly (even after adjusting for the bias) during the
crisis. This gives support to the fact that if there was a contagion from Russia to Brazil, the
most likely place of the transmission was the off-shore Brady markets.
Fifth, using daily data on several financial data from Bloomberg, one can check the
alternative hypothesis that it was the liquidity crisis in mature markets that timed the crisis in
Brazil and not the Russian crisis. However, most of the action happens immediately after the
Russian crisis both in the foreign exchange and the Brady bond markets, although the spreads
on the latter market suffer a new blow during the LTCM crisis. Therefore, rather than
concluding in favor of LTCM effect on this market, this leads us to favor the argument that
the Brazilian residents reinforced the speculation once they realize that foreign investors had
joined the outflow.- 38 -
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APPENDIX I:   Data Used in the Paper
• For the Brazilian stock market, we take daily closing figures from the Bovespa index, and
convert them to US dollars by the end-of-day exchange rate. For Russia, we do the same,
using the Moscou index. Converting the indices in dollars allows us to make keep our
analysis uniform before and after the devaluation of the currencies. Source: Bloomberg
• For sovereign bonds, we use the spreads on the Brazilian C-Bond and the Russian Euro-
bond (EB Russo - 2001). The spreads were calculated by subtracting the yield to maturity
of treasury bill with same duration from yield to maturity of the respective bonds:
Brazilian C-Bond; maturity: 4/15/2014, coupon: 8% variable – 6 months. Russian
Eurobond; maturity: 11/2001, coupon: 9.25% fixed – 6 months. Source: Bloomberg.
• Financial flows are the balance of the foreign exchange transactions in the financial
markets. Ultimately the government would have to balance the market balance in order to
keep the exchange rate crawling peg. However, the changes in reserves do not necessarily
track down exactly the financial exchange flows because some of the transactions are
settled with a lag period (30-days and so). Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
• The Central Bank of Brazil follows the maturing short term external liabilities of its
banking system in a weekly basis. The short term obligations include interbank and credit
lines. This survey based monitoring system was introduced on October 1998, after the
Russian crisis and during the negotiations with the IMF
• BIS exposure data obtained from their semi-annual reports on www.bis.org
• Daily interest rates and exchange rates from Bloomberg.
• News dummies created by the authors using news obtained from Bloomberg.- 41 -
APPENDIX II: Procedure for creating the dummy variables
The dummy variables were created by following a strict filtering process:
1. We began by collecting daily financial news for Brazil and Russia.  Our sources were
Reuters daily wire and Bloomberg update.  The goal was to separate news that truly
represent fundamentals from news that are mostly noise, or an attempt of the news writer
to somehow explain the movement in the market in the absence of any major events. We
broke down the raw news for each country.
2. For each country,  the news were separated into unambiguous “good” and “bad” news
categories.  Distinction between good and bad news was made by using simple
guidelines—credible attempts to re-structure the economy were deemed well, whereas
any news that represents further deterioration of the financial or real sector were
designated as bad.  At this point, we had ten lists of raw good and bad news for the five
countries under study ready to be filtered. The filtering was done by the following
criteria:
3. For good news, we ignored the given explanations of why the market did better  and
instead focused on news that met any of the following criteria:
• Successful formation of bailout arrangements;
• Announcement of rescue package by international organizations;
• Better-than-expected economic news (GDP growth better, inflation lower, etc.);
• Specific measures to stabilize the markets.
4. For bad news
• Collapse of the currency regime or of long-standing financial arrangements;
• Breakdown in negotiation with multilateral agencies;
• Large scale bankruptcy or firm closure;
• Credit rating downgrade;
• Worse than expected announcements about debt exposure, inflation, growth,
confusing policy moves;
• Threats or announcement of capital controls imposition;
• Resignation or firing of high profile officials;
5. Using the good and bad news series for each country we constructed two series of
dummy variables. On the dates there were good (bad) news we placed a number one on
the good (bad) news dummy series. Otherwise, we placed a zero on that date.
6. We avoided typical biases in the presentation of news by the agencies.  We ignored
typical market commentary statements like “there was widespread pessimism among the
traders today.”  We also avoided focusing on the actual movement in the financial
markets for a given day. We simply included news that fell into any of the above
categories  instead of finding good news on days the markets went down and vice-versa.
7. News that came out at the end of a business day were dated the following day.
The news items were checked across the different sources to verify date and content.- 42 -
APPENDIX III : Forbes  and Rigobon (1998) adjustment
Fobers and Rigobon (1998) show that the estimated correlation between two
stochastic variables, x and y, increases when the variance of x increases—even if the actual
correlation between x and y does not change. The standard, unadjusted correlation coefficient
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Manipulating the above equation yields:











We use the above methodology to adjust the above methodology to adjust the crisis period
correlations.- 43 -
APPENDIX IV: News chronology
Good News: Russia
July 14: The Yeltsin government said on Sunday that it had reached agreement with the
International Monetary Fund on a multi-billion-dollar package to stabilize Russia's
financial markets.
August 7: Russia will receive the first  $300 million of  its third  $1.5-billion structural
adjustment loan from the World Bank on Monday.  At a  meeting in  Washington
Thursday the board of directors of the World Bank  voted unanimously to release the
loan to Russia on the terms agreed to earlier.
Sept. 10: The Kremlin confirmed that President Boris Yeltsin had decided to ask parliament
to approve Acting Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov as Russia's new prime minister.
Communists, liberals and politicians close to President Boris Yeltsin showed rare unity
in praising Primakov and predicting rapid approval by parliament in a vote scheduled for
Friday.
Oct 14: Prime minister Primakov says banking reform is a priority, and scraps the 3 percent
import tax, 10 percent VAT on food.
Nov 7: After weeks of tense negotiations, Moscow persuaded foreign creditors to accept
ruble-denominated securities as part of a restructuring plan of its frozen $40bn treasury
bill (GKO) market. In return, the finance ministry dropped its insistence on including
Russian commercial banks' outstanding forward dollar contracts in the plan.
Feb 8: Russia is to let foreign holders of frozen government rouble debt use all the proceeds
of new debt received in a swap to buy shares on the MICEX.
Feb 10: Russia will drop its 3% import duty in March in keeping with a Wednesday decision
of the government commission on preventive measures in foreign trade and customs.
Feb 18: The Russian government plans to halve duties on some exports to stimulate foreign
investment, the country's customs chief announced today.  Also, The German
government is prepared to reschedule remaining Soviet-era debt with Russia as part of a
show of "economic solidarity" with the crisis-hit country, the head of the German
Chancellor's economic policy department said.
Feb 25: Russia expects to collect over 16 billion roubles ($700.5 million) in cash taxes in
February, slightly more than the target.
Bad News: Russia- 44 -
August 6: Deputy finds Duma approval of 1999 budget unlikely -- The  government-
proposed 1999  federal budget will  not be  approved by  the State  Duma through
regular debate procedures, according to Duma Budget committee chairman Alexander
Zhukov (Russian Regions).
Aug 10: Russia's Finance Ministry canceled Wednesday's government paper auctions at
which it had planned to offer six billion roubles of new issues, citing poor market
conditions, a ministry official said on Monday.
Aug 11: In late trade on Monday, benchmark front month Brent crude oil futures on the
International Petroleum Exchange in London slid to trade for the last time at $11.90 per
barrel, equaling 10-year lows set in March. This not only affects Russia's revenues from
oil exports but jeopardizes other areas of the economy by making Russia less attractive
to foreign investors.
Aug 13: In the face of an unprecedented liquidity crisis, the Russian central bank imposes
limits on foreign exchange purchases and increases access to overnight credit.
Aug 17: The rouble was allowed to float freely within the bounds of a new corridor expanded
to 6.00/9.50 to the dollar from 5.27/7.13 previously.  Also, a 90-day moratorium was
declared on some foreign debt servicing.
Aug 18: Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings on all Russian corporate foreign
debt issuers to Caa1 and the ratings remained on review for further possible downgrade.
Aug 27: In the middle of exchange rate volatility, the Russian  government￿s offer for the
restructuring of its frozen  GKO Treasury  bills find no buyers in the market.
Aug 28: President Boris Yeltsin dismisses reformer Anatoly Chubais from the post of
Russia's top negotiator with international financial institutions. Chubais, formerly
Russia's privatization chief, played a key role in winning a multi-billion dollar loan from
the International Monetary Fund in July.
Sept 15: As a compromise to the political showdown of last week, President Yeltsin hires a
group of Gorbachev era economists.
Sept 24: Russian federal budget revenues dropped significantly in the first three weeks of
September due to the country's payments crisis, the finance ministry said.  The central
bank announced that reserves had fallen to $12 billion.
Sept 25: The government press service confirmed that the sale of a 75 percent plus one share
stake in Rosneft, the last big oil company still in state hands, had been scrapped. Rosneft
had earlier failed to sell at $2.1 billion and again at $1.6 billion.  In a further blow
Gazprom, Russia's biggest company and tax payer and the world's biggest gas company,- 45 -
said it was cutting tax payments to two billion roubles a month from the 3.5 billion it had
been due to pay.
Sept 28: A spokesman for the All-Russian Insurers' Union said that the crisis would pare
down the number of insurers to 300-400 companies from 1,400 now and that even a few
major firms would fail.  Also, suits were filed against Lehmann Brothers after the
investment bank froze assests of Inkombank and UNEXIM bank for not honoring debt
obligations.
Oct 1: The World Bank said that previous plans to lend Russia $6 billion was now in doubt
given the changed market conditions.
Nov 20: Russian Deputy Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said on Friday that his
cash-strapped nation would be able to repay less than $10 billion out of $17 billion of
foreign debt due next year.
Dec 1: Russia's  Interdepartmental Commission for Export Pipelines  and Sea Terminals
suspends the issue of export documents to four oil companies.  Also, Sberbank
announced that due to lack of cash and other "technical difficulties," depositors will have
to wait until some future date to have finally gained access to their savings after
transferring their accounts from failing commercial banks to Sberbank.
Dec 3: Deposits in Russian banks fall 15% from August levels.  FDI falls 14% from a year
ago.
Dec 4: Inflation in Russia was 65.3% from January to  November, compared with just 10% in
the same  period last year, reported the State Statistics Committee.
Dec 11: The  Russian federal government in January-October earned  1.425 billion  rubles
from privatization,  just 17.5% of an annual target of 8.12 billion rubles.
Dec 17: Russia is  not interested  in allowing nonresidents to acquire  shares in  companies
for  the new OFZ federal bonds that they  will receive  in exchange for currently frozen
GKO Treasury  bills and OFZ, said Finance Minister Mikhail  Zadornov.
Dec 28: New reports from the State Statistics Committee shows that Russian gross domestic
product shrank by 3.3% in the  first nine  months of  the year to 1.88 trillion rubles,  and
not 3% as  reported earlier.
Dec 29: In a pessimistic assessment of the government's economic policies, Boris Fyodorov,
the country's former tax chief, said that Russia's federal tax receipts could drop by as
much as 50% in 1999.
Dec 30: Russia has missed a $360 million dollar payment due on its Soviet-era debt, the
paying agent for the debt said today.- 46 -
Jan 11: Western banks said that they were no longer in talks on the GKO restructuring deal
and were studying prospects for legal action to force better terms.
Jan 12: Russia's chief prosecutor on Monday said that government officials may have
illegally used a $4.8 billion loan from the IMF the country received in July.
Jan 13: Russia￿s fuel ministry slamed planned oil export tax; A spokesman said the ministry
was "categorically against" the plan￿s of the energy ministry to introduce export tariffs
on oil products. Also,  Fitch IBCA said on Wednesday it had downgraded the long-term
foreign currency rating assigned to Russia's PRIN  bonds to DD from CC.
Jan 29: Russia's troubled Uneximbank told creditors on Thursday it could not pay interest on
a $50 million international bond, raising fears it will become next week the first Russian
borrower to default on a Eurobond.
Feb 3: Yamburggazdobycha, the largest production unit of Russian gas giant Gazprom is
facing a bankruptcy hearing in a dispute over unpaid promissory notes.  Also, some 60
percent of Russia's top 17 banks have assets which are worthless, the head of
once-leading bank SBS-Agro was quoted on Wednesday as saying.
Feb 5: Rating agency Standard & Poor's said on Friday that cash-strapped Russia may start to
miss payments on its Eurobonds later this year although the country has pledged to meet
all payments on this debt.
Feb 9: The International Finance Corp, a key provider of finance for Russia's private sector,
has been forced radically to scale down plans for 1999.  Also, Rating agency Standard &
Poor's has said that a downgrade of Russia's foreign debt "could occur in the near future"
if  the country does not  receive new  external loans or if the government does  not take
other steps to "shore up its foreign-exchange position."
Good News: Brazil
July 9: Pedro Parente announces the reduction of the IOF(financial tax), 15% to 16%, to
stimulate demand.
July 29: Privatization of Telebrás raises R$ 22 billions to the government.
August 5: Annual inflation rate (0,97%) is the lowest in 49 years.
August 12: Government reduces import taxes on capital goods.
August 22: Central Bank of Brazil auctions dollar-linked bonds to calm the markets.
August 24: Government passes legislation stimulating capital inflows.- 47 -
September 8: Government announces spending cuts of R$ 11 billions.
October 5: FHC is reelected.
October 21: IMF and the Brazilian Government announce an agreement on 3-year fiscal
targets.
October 22: An IMF-Brazil program is announced.
October 26: World Bank announces US$ 4 or 5 billions of financial help.
October 28: Fiscal adjustment plan is announced.
November 13: IMF’s program amounts to US$ 41 billions to Brazil.
November 18: Congress approves an important social security reform measures.
December 9: Senate approves agreement with the IMF.
January 7: Brazil receives US$ 1 billion from World Bank to reform social security.
February 12: Brazilian treasury pays for Minas Gerais eurobonds.
February 26: Arminio Fraga is appointed  the new president of the Central Bank.
March 10: Important financial tax, CPMF, is approved by Congress in the 1
st round.
March 16: Brazil reduces capital inflow tax from 2% to 0,5%.
March 18: Congress approves CPMF on second round.
March 29: Current account’s deficit falls to US$ 924 millions.
March 31: IMF approve new and more ambitious version of fiscal adjustment.
April 9: Itau Bank issues US$ 150 millions in international markets.
April 19: Brazil announces it will issue 5 year global bonds, partly in exchange for Brady
bonds.
April 23: Government announces a R$ 7,1 billions budget surplus in 1Q99.
April 30: Agriculture production forecast for 1999 is 7,37% over 1998.- 48 -
June 1: Exports grow 19% in May and trade surplus reaches US$ 312 millions. Also,
unemployment falls in April to 8,78%.
June 7: Industrial production falls only 0,3% in April.
June 22: IMF revises forecast of GDP growth to -1,2% for this year.
Bad News: Brazil
July 1: May has the highest level of unemployment (8,2%) in 14 years.
September 4: Moody’s downgrades Brazilian sovereign and corporate debt.
November 11: Industrial production falls 2,4% in September.
November 24: J.P. Morgan announces that they forecast that Brazilian economy will decline
4,3% in 1999.
December 3: Congress vote against important social security measure.
January 6: State of Minas declares unilateral moratorium.
January 13: Central Bank governor Gustavo Franco resigns.
January 28: Announcement  that the level of industrial employment fell 1,2% in November.
January 29: Bank runs. Finance Minister Malan announces that there will be no deposit
freeze.
February 10: State of Minas defaults on its eurobonds.
February 19: GNP grows only 0,2% in 1998.
February 23: Panic. Exchange rate brakes R$ 2,00 level.
March 8: Important food company, Sadia,  adjusts prices by 18%.
March 17: Federal judges on strike,  demanding higher wages.
March 24: Bank scandal: Brazilian revenue service investigates bank’s profits from
devaluation.
March 24: Brazil announces it will adopt inflation targeting in the beginning of June.- 49 -
April 1: Central Bank investigates allegation of leaks before January’s devaluation.
April 12: Congress creates committee  to investigate allegation of inside information in the
banking system.
May 17: Brazilian government revise downwards trade surplus forecast for 1999.
May 27: Unemployment level reaches 20% in São Paulo.
May 31: Government losses  in court.
June 9: Energy prices increase by 14%.